

FOREIGN POLICY bulletin



AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 14

What Next in Algeria?

by Mario Rossi

UNITED NATIONS—The United Nations General Assembly concluded an elaborate debate on the Algerian question with a unanimously adopted resolution, which was recognized to be a masterpiece of evasion.

The Assembly wished neither to become involved in a controversy for which it could suggest no solution, nor to take sides with either the Algerian nationalists or the French, nor to compromise eventual negotiations. To that extent it succeeded. Each side emerged from the debate convinced it had achieved a great victory and had won over world opinion.

The resolution, which Italy had a leading role in persuading the French to accept—and Iran, the Afro-Asian nations—reads as follows: "The General Assembly, having heard the statements made by various delegations, and discussed the question of Algeria, [and] having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human life, expresses the hope that in a spirit of cooperation a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The first clause was considered by the

French as a mere statement of fact which did not prejudice their thesis concerning the non-competence of the UN to deal with a matter of "internal jurisdiction." To the Algerian nationalists it meant that the UN had "declared itself competent" in the Algerian question and, indirectly, had considered the issue to be outside exclusive French jurisdiction.

The second clause was interpreted as a condemnation of French colonial methods by some, but of Algerian terrorism by others. The final clause could refer to the French plan for holding elections and subsequently for dealing with Algerian representatives in a "spirit of cooperation" and without interference from the UN, as laid down, in French opinion, by the Charter. It could also mean an appeal for "negotiations" on the basis of the right to self-determination, equally recognized by the Charter.

These contrasting interpretations dramatize a basic point of agreement: that the representatives of France must sit down and work out a permanent solution of the Algerian problem. Who should represent France? The answer is simple: Whoever happens to be in power at the time in Paris. No matter how

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many cabinets France may have in a given year, they are appointed according to constitutional procedures and they all speak for France.

The problem of representation, however, is infinitely complex when applied to Algeria, for it is impossible now to say who speaks for its people. The Algerian nationalists point to the widespread warfare which taxes France's resources and engages half a million of its soldiers. Whoever can order this warfare stopped, they say, speaks for Algeria. The French have promised free elections after peace and order have been restored. "But peace and order will never be restored, and consequently no elections will be held, until the French are ready to negotiate with us," a spokesman for the Algerian nationalists told the writer.

These two irreconcilable views go to the heart of the Algerian problem. The French plan to hold elections in an Algeria which they continue to regard as an integral part of the metropolitan territory—a department of France. If Algerian nationalists accept elections within this framework, this would mean they agree that Algeria will remain part of France—the very point they challenge. Yet if they reject elections, then, according to the French, this means they "teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the government."

This basic conflict explains why the Algerian nationalists oppose the elections planned by France and will try, if they can, to prevent them. What they are asking for is a plebiscite, that is, the right of self-determi-

nation, which they claim the UN resolution has recognized as exercisable by the Algerian people. The French, however, categorically oppose a plebiscite to determine whether the Algerians want to preserve their present relationship with France or choose complete independence. Force, therefore, remains the arbiter. Through force the French hope to crush the rebels and hold elections to confirm the *status quo*. Through force the nationalists hope to defeat the *status quo* and achieve independence.

Hope — and Menace

As of now the Algerian picture looks discouraging, but it contains elements of both hope and menace. One hopeful factor is the cultural affinity between France and the older generation of Algerians. Another is the attitude of the newly independent states of Tunisia and Morocco.

Both these factors need explanation. A most dramatic and often overlooked aspect of the Algerian situation is that more than one half the Muslim population is under 20 years of age. The youth are susceptible to extremist propaganda, especially to "Nasserism," which could radically change the situation, much for the worst. The present participants in the Algerian drama, however, have no interest in allowing the situation to deteriorate to the point where contact between Algerians and Frenchmen might become increasingly difficult. A large number of the present leaders of the rebellion are intellectually and emotionally closer

to the ideals of France than to those of Nasser. Today, it is still possible for France to "negotiate" with them, and conversations did in fact take place last spring and summer in Cairo and Rome. Should these conversations be abandoned, the leadership of the rebellion may be assumed by young people who reject French ideals and political principles. This would be a tragic development for future relations between the French and Muslim populations of Algeria, which must coexist and collaborate if the country is to be saved from political and economic collapse.

A switch to extremist positions might bring a call for "Arab solidarity" and religious identification with the Muslim world which would prevent the development of a secular society. Religious fanaticism, in turn, might cause an irreparable split between the Muslims and the French, with grave repercussions throughout North Africa.

An understanding in Algeria is necessary also because upon it depends the collaboration of Tunisia and Morocco with the West. The hostility of these two countries toward Nasser and all he stands for is well known; but they have tied their development to the creation of a North African Federation, and if their plans are flouted, they might come to be dominated by leaders favorable to Nasser and opposed to the West.

Writer and lecturer, Mr. Rossi for the past four years has reported for *The Christian Science Monitor* on Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian and North African events as reflected at the United Nations.

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U.S. Plus UN: New Formula

Out of the crisis over sanctions against Israel has come a new—and more realistic—United States attitude toward the United Nations.

Having first swung over to almost total United States reliance on the UN, at the time of the Suez crisis last October, to keep the peace and settle international disputes, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles are now pulling back to a middle ground of reliance on both direct diplomacy and the UN. Since this second approach seems to have borne fruit in the Middle East crisis—when the first was getting nowhere—it is reasonable to expect that Washington will play it this way in the future.

Reliance principally, primarily and almost totally on the UN has its points. It is a good substitute for indecision. It leaves the ball-carrying to someone else—when you don't know what to do with it yourself. It can be a good interim policy. But there are objections to making it a permanent arrangement—with the world as it is and the UN as it is. It sounds good, and might be good, if the UN were something that it isn't. No one concerned with the development of the world community can argue the value of building up the prestige and authority of the UN. But the UN is still only a voluntary organization of sovereign states with no authority of its own—except such authority as its members give to it.

The Israel crisis has proved a significant experience for President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles. They have discovered the shortcomings of the UN and, in consequence, been driven to asserting leadership consistent with this country's power and respon-

sibility. They have learned that it is not a case of "either-or," but of pursuing both lines of endeavor simultaneously to clarify today's confusions. They have also been goaded into action by congressional criticism (not limited to Democrats), which has contrasted Eisenhower's "one rule of conduct toward everybody" with the UN's "double standard" implementation of its resolutions.

Lessons of Israel Crisis

Mr. Dulles has been particularly frank in recognizing that he and others may have learned something from this experience with the Israel crisis. The Administration will be slower to propose resolutions which it is obvious cannot be implemented; and it will be quicker to back with action such resolutions as are passed. Incidentally, Mr. Dulles' acknowledgement that recent events have brought valuable lessons is but recognition in reverse of the British and French contention that the invasion of Egypt had to be staged in order to alert the West—that is, the United States—and to avert a greater danger. The fact that only after this invasion and the resulting general world alarm did President Eisenhower come out with his Middle East Doctrine—designed to protect the area from Communist domination—gives substance to the Anglo-French contention.

It was during the invasion period that the United States, possibly for lack of an alternative, decided to put all its eggs in the UN basket and "leave it to Dag"—who, while a remarkable man, cannot constitutionally become a substitute for the foreign offices of individual nations. It is no

reflection on Mr. Hammarskjöld's accomplishments to point out that some months later Eisenhower and Dulles decided to revert to old-fashioned direct diplomacy. Mr. Dulles came forward with his "assurances" of United States support for the right of "innocent passage" in the Gulf of Aqaba and neutralization of the Gaza Strip, which broke the Arab-Israeli deadlock, and the President started a round of top-level personal diplomatic talks.

The result is that, by pursuing their goals through the UN but simultaneously using the time-tested art of direct personal diplomacy, the President and the Secretary of State have again given recognizable direction to United States foreign policy. Now they are attempting to steer UN action through action of their own. It is to their credit that as they surveyed the Middle East debacle from the moral heights they had scaled in October, they chose to descend again into the arena and take part directly in the difficult and dangerous affairs of the world.

There is a simplicity in total reliance on the UN which is tempting but hardly realistic. Washington's experience with this approach during the Middle East crisis suggests that while action through the UN provides a good holding operation, it is no substitute for direct negotiations when the going gets rough. The UN has its advantages—and they are becoming clearer with every crisis the international organization tackles; but it also has its limitations—and the Israel crisis has made them apparent to both President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles.

NEAL STANFORD



Eurafrika: More Colonialism—or More Interdependence?

A new term has been introduced into the international vocabulary.

The new term is Eurafrika. For some, and particularly for the French who have sponsored it, Eurafrika stands for a new kind of partnership between Europe, source of political experience, capital, and technological know-how, and the West's remaining African colonies, source of strategic raw materials and market for the manufactured goods of a united Europe. For others, who may have been made unduly skeptical by years of Western colonialism, Eurafrika means a new, perhaps more efficient and therefore more lasting, way of maintaining the control of Europeans, recently eroded by mounting nationalism, over the still technologically backward peoples of Africa.

The concept of Eurafrika is the product of French imagination, which has proved fertile in projects for regional integration, among them the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC), which foundered in 1954 on the shoals of France's own nationalism, particularly its historically justifiable fear of a restored and remilitarized Germany. Yet, in a move fraught with drama for those familiar with the complexities of achieving European integration, it is France which in February proposed to bring the overseas territories of European nations into the common market: that six nations of Western Europe — France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—have agreed to form. Of these nations, Belgium rules the Belgian Congo, rich in raw materials, notably uranium, but it is the African territories under French rule which are so far involved in the new

concept of Eurafrika. And in Eurafrika France's old enemy, Germany, now economically restored, would play a key role under the French project.

France's proposal—eloquently presented by Socialist Premier Guy Mollet during his visit to the United States, particularly in his address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on February 28—has two important aspects.

French Control —

First, the French assume that they will continue to maintain political control of their territories in Africa, including Algeria—at present a department of metropolitan France—although they reluctantly granted independence in 1956 to their former protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. They have no intention of placing their African colonies under the rule of a united Europe administration. This means that in contrast to Britain, which is following a policy of granting political independence to its African territories as soon as they appear to be ready for it—notably the Gold Coast, which with London's blessing was transformed on March 6 into the independent state of Ghana — France does not look toward independence for its African territories.

In this respect a conflict looms between the Africa policies of Britain and France. The British do not want to hold on indefinitely to their principal African territories — especially those which, like the Gold Coast, have few, or no, white settlers. The French, by contrast, want to stay in Africa—particularly where, as in Algeria, French settlers have lived for

generations and have acquired a substantial economic stake.

— But European Capital

At the same time the French realistically recognize that, in the straitened circumstances of the post-World War II period, they lack the financial resources to develop their African territories on a scale consonant with the "rising expectations" of the atomic age. They therefore propose that the five other nations composing the European common market should share in the development of their territories by contributing funds, in the form of gifts rather than loans or investments, for such "not immediately profitable" undertakings as the construction of roads, harbors, hospitals, schools, irrigation projects and so on.

The Western European nations have shown hesitation about accepting France's proposal. They fear two things: first, that by sharing France's "white man's burden," they may also fall heir to the hostility France has incurred in Algeria and might incur elsewhere; and, second, some of them—notably Italy—fear the competition in Europe's markets of agricultural products from France's African colonies. Britain, which does not want its African territories included in what it regards as a "zone of protection," fears that the French project would entail discrimination against its African colonies and former colonies like Ghana.

The French, however, present two counterarguments which they regard as persuasive. First, they contend that African territories developed and modernized through the joint

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Cuba in Ferment

by Herbert L. Matthews

Mr. Matthews has been with *The New York Times* since 1922, and since 1949 has served as a member of its editorial staff, covering Latin American affairs. He has frequently visited Cuba in the past five years and was there in February for ten days. He is the author of "The U.S. and Latin America," *Headline Series* No. 100 (New York, Foreign Policy Association, July 1953).

On March 13 a desperate and sanguinary attempt to kill President Fulgencio Batista in his Havana palace failed. It is important for Americans to understand the background of this uprising.

Cuba lives amid crises. It has had a stormy life for nearly a century, first in its struggle for independence from Spain and—since 1902—in its violent and thus far unsuccessful efforts to achieve a viable, honest democracy.

The storm is once again rising to gale strength. This time new forces are at work. For the first time it is possible to hope that the old, corrupt pattern will be broken.

It hurts Cubans, understandably, when foreigners write about them in terms that they themselves use. No people could be more critical of the Cuban political system than the Cubans themselves. They have no illusions and, indeed, are cynical and defeatist to a point that shocks outsiders. Yet they feel that criticism is their prerogative, as within a family, and the outsider should either mind his own business or show the politeness to be expected of guests who are invited into someone's home. It might be evident that the unmarried daughter is going to have a child, but one does not remark upon it and, least of all, go about proclaiming the fact to the world. There is a *pun-donor*—a point of honor—involved.

Corruption and Inefficiency

Yet a student of Cuban affairs must stick to the facts, however unpleasant and embarrassing these facts may be. From the political point of

view the history of the Cuban Republic is a sordid mixture of corruption and inefficiency. Nature's gifts have been squandered, and the human resources of a brave, intelligent, fine people have been wasted. What seems so thrilling about the Cuban situation today is that the best elements of Cuban society are at last trying to get together to create a new, decent, democratic Cuba.

The Cubans' inheritance from Spain was a bad one. Government was autocratic, hierarchical and corrupt. Politics was nothing but a spoils system, entered as a career for the riches and patronage that could be squeezed out of it, not to serve the country and the people. An honest and efficient civil service could not be built up when each successive president or dictator swept the boards, put his own followers in, set a bad example, and paid such low salaries that bribery was almost a necessity. Since political power meant money and not service, the game of politics meant nothing but a struggle of the outs to get in so that they could profit instead of their opponents.

The people of Cuba were the victims of this system. The vast majority were just as honest, decent and patriotic as any other people. However, they were neither able nor willing to assert themselves enough to "drive the rascals out." Given the system, what is remarkable is that so many honest and patriotic citizens entered the political arena and served successive governments. Nothing said here should be construed as meaning that the present govern-

ment of General Fulgencio Batista does not contain its quota of high-minded, patriotic and thoroughly honest men. The trouble is, and always has been, that such men are in the minority and that the essential power lies in the hands of men who are not scrupulous.

A Sugar Economy

The economy is based on sugar. It has been said: "As sugar goes, so goes Cuba." When the market is good and prices are high, Cuba is prosperous and internal affairs are relatively peaceful. When sugar prices fall, there is great economic distress and internal strife. For example, during the United States depression that began in 1929 and was followed by the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff law, Cuban sugar was driven down to 0.5 cents a pound. The resulting terrible misery contributed greatly to the revolution that finally overthrew the brutal president and dictator, Gerardo Machado, in 1933, in a popular movement headed by "a sergeant named Batista." By contrast, during the Korean war, which began in 1950, sugar rose above eight cents a pound. This was the high point of a decade which saw "the dance of the millions" when the national income from sugar rose to \$750 million a year.

Corruption and graft in that period were almost incredible in size and shamelessness. Fulgencio Batista, by then a colonel, had himself elected in 1940. In 1944 he held a fair election, and his candidate lost to Ramón Grau San Martín. Dr. Grau

then had the greatest opportunity of the century to introduce an honest, efficient government. Instead, he had an utterly corrupt, utterly inefficient administration (1944-48), in which he enriched himself to such an extent that a courageous senator and lawyer, Pelayo Cuervo, was later able to institute a public suit against Dr. Grau for \$174,241,840 for misappropriation of government moneys. No one in Cuba thought this excessive; nothing has come of the suit.

Dr. Grau's successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-52), came in on another wave of hope that quickly receded. Prío was a brave student at the University of Havana who fought well and was imprisoned under the Machado regime. The students then, as now, were fighting for freedom and decent government. Prío, in power, provided neither, and in so doing he put a stain on the student movement from which it has yet to recover. Cubans, who are prone to defeatism about their politicians and revolutionaries, point to Prío and ask whether the youths who are fighting President Batista today would be any better if they came to power.

In addition to the enormity of the graft and corruption during this whole period there was, especially under Grau and Prío, a great deal of internal disorder. It was a form of political gangsterism, of which we saw a certain amount during the prohibition era in this country. Factions within the government fought for the spoils of office, and those on the outside were trying to get in.

It was not a pretty picture, but one thing had to be said for it—Cuba was developing a democratic process. After all, there had been elections every two years since 1940. As other countries in Latin America—Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Peru—have demonstrated, if the electoral process is given a chance and can be

repeated often enough, democracy will become rooted and good government will begin to shape up. In June 1952 Cuba was to have another presidential election, another step in the democratic process, another chance, another hope.

Batista's Blow at Democracy

All this was dashed to the ground by General Fulgencio Batista, a candidate for the presidency who knew he would lose. Batista staged a garrison revolt on March 10, 1952, seized power, and has kept it ever since. In so doing he set Cuba back politically for a generation; and Cubans have not forgiven him for what he did. He became a military dictator, and although he got himself elected to office again on November 1, 1954, he remains a military dictator. Today there is no democracy in Cuba.

There is prosperity. The price of sugar—a little over five cents—is high. The crop is nearly harvested now, and it is all going to be sold. Cuba will receive something like \$400 million for it. But it can no longer be said that as sugar goes, so goes Cuba. General Batista himself had gone against that dictum by staging his revolt in a period of prosperity. Other factors than sugar now began to operate.

Obviously, General Batista had a majority of the people against him. If they had been for him, he would have been the leading candidate in the 1952 presidential campaign instead of a sure loser. He did not even have a majority of the Army behind him. He succeeded by seizing the main garrison of Cuba—Camp Columbia outside Havana—and winning the soldiers and officers over. There was not a single officer with a national following opposed to him elsewhere, and no organization with which to stage what would have had to be a civil war.

Fulgencio Batista is a man of great resource, courage and ability. He had been far and away the outstanding figure of Cuba since the "Sergeants' Revolt" that he led in 1933. Even when not in the presidency, even as a voluntary exile in Miami, he dominated the Cuban scene, in reality or potentially. The last quarter of a century can well be labeled "The Batista Era."

How had he done it? Unfortunately for Cuba, he used the old formula. It is true that he eliminated gangsterism. He gave Cuba something for the enormous sums that were appropriated in the way of public works. He carried the country successfully through a difficult crisis in the sugar market. He turned against the Communists. Except in the field of labor legislation, North Americans had reasons to be satisfied with the Batista government's policies. American enterprises were protected, and new investments were encouraged. Cuba ranks third, after Venezuela and Brazil, among the 20 Latin American countries in the size of United States investments, now well over the \$700 million mark.

Yet General Batista has had to rule during these five years as a dictator without popular support. For a while he seemed to want a regime that would hold corruption down and would restore the democratic processes. However, his own greed and the weight of Cuban political traditions were too much for him.

Widespread Graft

Instead of the graft being taken by civilians it was now taken by the high Army officers who had helped Batista to seize power and were supporting him. Graft in Cuba is taken from public works, the lottery, gambling, smuggling and the acceptance of bribes. Hundreds of millions of dollars a year that should go to the

nation go into the pockets of the president, some of his ministers, many of his high military officers, rings of businessmen handling public works, and plain crooks and gangsters who run the smuggling and gambling for the "respectable" men who profit from them.

This is common knowledge in Cuba. No honest Cuban—or foreigner for that matter—knowing the facts can deny this or would deny it. When such a regime is imposed by a dictatorship that deprives the people of freedom, is it any wonder that forces build up seeking to overthrow it?

It is not enough to say that regimes like General Batista's are nothing new in Cuba, that Cubans have suffered them before with patience and cynicism, and that after all the nation carries on and even prospers as it does today. History is a dynamic process; people learn that bad and corrupt governments are not necessary. The Cuban people are intelligent, politically conscious, vital and brave. These, too, are undeniable facts. It stands to reason that a time will come when such people will say: "We have had enough of corruption and dictatorship; we want decency and liberty." Perhaps that moment has come. At least, there are signs that point in this direction.

Rising Opposition

In order to succeed, such a movement must oppose all the historic political parties and their leaders. Until now, the opposition to General Batista was most effectively led by ex-President Prío Socarrás from exile and by ex-President Grau San Martín from inside the country. For Cuba to pass from General Batista to a military junta of the generals now milking the country, or from Batista to political cliques headed by Grau or Prío or anyone like them, would

mean nothing. The same old, corrupt, inefficient system would go on with different faces.

At last, a great many of the best elements in Cuba have realized this and are gradually getting together. Only the beginnings of such a movement exist, yet it can be seen clearly by anyone who gets below the surface in Cuba today.

'Revolt of the Youth'

The most dramatic feature of this opposition is the "Revolt of the Youth," whose primary symbol and leader is Fidel Castro. This young law student, now 30, is leading guerrilla warfare in the rugged Sierra Maestra mountains of Oriente Province, down at the eastern end of the island. He landed from Mexico with 82 youths on December 2, 1956, was almost wiped out but reconstituted his forces. At the time of writing, the government has still been unable to liquidate him, and his rebellion constitutes a running sore that is very serious to the regime. The writer penetrated the Sierra Maestra on February 17 for a long talk with Fidel Castro and was impressed with his confidence and his apparently impregnable position.

Fidel Castro has a large following throughout Oriente Province, which is one of the most fertile in Cuba and contains about 2 million of the island's less than 6 million inhabitants. His "26th of July Movement," as it is called, also has many followers in Havana and other parts of the island. Moreover, the university students are fighting a parallel battle. In Cuba, as in most Latin countries, the students have a noble record of courage against oppression. Because of the stand taken by the students, the principal universities cannot even be opened.

A civic resistance movement of respected citizens in all professions, in

business and banking and among middle- and upper-class women has developed in Oriente and is being formed in Havana Province. A number of respected figures in politics are being attracted to this opposition movement. The hope is that it can become sufficiently strong to persuade enough of the good elements among the Army officers—and, of course, there are many decent, patriotic officers—that they would have genuine popular backing for an uprising against the old order.

Meanwhile, however, General Batista holds the strongest cards. His Army generals are bound to him by their material interests. The rank and file have been greatly favored by the dictator, and although the cream of the Army is fighting very poorly indeed in the Sierra Maestra, the troops as a whole would stand by the regime today. The police are also, of course, tied to the Batista regime. Leaders of both the Army and police have shown such brutality during the last three months in their "counter-terrorism" that they would not last long after a successful revolution.

Bombings in the big cities are almost nightly occurrences. Sabotage is widespread, although not serious. The government, unable to stop the terrorism or find the perpetrators, has been resorting to a terror of its own. Fulgencio Batista is now being compared to Gerardo Machado in his last, terrible years. Cubans can understand killing opponents, but they will not long stand for indiscriminate killing.

Even the economic situation is heading for a crisis in a year or two. The experts say sugar prices will decline, and the \$350 million public works program, which comes to a close in 1958, has been financed by unorthodox inflationary methods which threaten the Cuban peso.

If General Batista can avoid any

serious mistakes from now on, he should be able to get through his latest presidential term, which ends in February 1959. However, he has been making some bad mistakes—among them the recent imposition of censorship—and strong forces are building up against him. Cuba, we must remember, is an unpredictable country.

READING SUGGESTIONS: There is no contemporary work on Cuba bringing the history of the island up to date, and there has been no such book in the last quarter of a century. The latest serious political work on Cuba is a biography of President Batista by his public relations official, Edmund Chester, entitled *A Sergeant Named Batista* (New York, Holt, 1954). The only serious magazine article on Cuban politics in the last three years is "Rifle Rule in Cuba," by Carleton Beals, in *The Christian Century* of November 21, 1956. As its title indicates, it is hostile to General Batista. The best source of contemporary information of a general nature is probably the files of *The New York Times*, which published three uncensored articles on Cuba, by Herbert L. Matthews, on February 24, 25 and 26, 1957.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 108)

efforts of Europe's advanced industrial nations will offer new markets for united Europe's pooled manufacturing facilities. Second—and over the long run most important—a modernized Africa integrated with a united Europe would, according to the French, form an effective barrier against expansion by the U.S.S.R., whether directly or through Egypt,

which the French still regard as the devil in the piece, not only of the Middle East but also of Muslim Africa, notably Algeria.

Because of their desire to prevent the atomization of Africa through the creation of weak small states which might easily fall prey to outside powers, the French view with alarm Britain's policy of granting independence to countries like Ghana. Integration, not disintegration through an excess of nationalism, is France's goal in Africa.

To those who question the acceptability of this goal by the peoples of Africa, the French reply that they intend to grant their African territories self-government and consequently the right to determine the economic and social projects on which the proposed European development fund, estimated at \$800 million (of which \$300 million is to be contributed by France) would be spent. Such self-government, however, M. Mollet has made clear, must be established within the framework of integration with France. "Our concern," he said on February 28, "must be to have the dependent peoples bypass the stage of nationalism. Our aim must be to free men from all forms of oppression without their becoming isolated on that account."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FPA Bookshelf

AFRICA

Year Book & Guide to East Africa, edited by A. Gordon-Brown. New York, Wilson, 1956. \$3.00.

Primarily geared to travel purposes, this compact reference book gives comprehensive details about the countries from Egypt to Madagascar, including a brief history, details on government, geography, climate and so on, as well as statistics on such subjects as banking, manufacturing, exports and imports, population, etc.

Mr. Gordon-Brown has edited a similar volume on Southern Africa (*Year Book & Guide to Southern Africa*, New York, Wilson, 1956, \$3.00), which covers the Union of South Africa, South-West Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

LATIN AMERICA

In *Neighbors to the South* (rev. ed., New York, Harcourt, 1956, \$3.50), Delia Goetz, staff member of the United States Office of Education, Division of International Education, has brought up to date her popular introduction to the republics of Latin America, first published in 1941. The presentation of current developments, outlined against background historical data—political and social—makes this a valuable preface to further study of, and interest in, the lands below the Rio Grande. A more intensive review is Arthur P. Whitaker's *Argentine Upheaval: Perón's Fall and the New Regime* (Foreign Policy Research Institute Series No. 1, University of Pennsylvania; New York, Praeger, 1956, \$3.50). The revolution against Perón is described, and its implications, both domestic and international, are analyzed.

MIDDLE EAST

Harry B. Ellis, for three years Middle Eastern correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, gives a lively and readable survey of the complex problems of that area in *Heritage of the Desert: The Arabs and the Middle East* (New York, Ronald Press, 1956, \$5.00).

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